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THE BOARD AGAINST ALL ODDS:
ASSESSING THE POWERS OF
DELEGATED MANAGEMENT IN BRAZIL
Alexandre Edde Diniz de Oliveira*
HIS article aims to analyze the contractual allocation of decision-
making power to the board of directors in Brazilian public compa-
nies. Unlike U.S. law, Brazil's corporate statute bestows original
and supreme decision-making power to the shareholders' meeting in run-
ning of the firm, while reserving a comparatively ancillary role to the
board. At the same time, however, the statute permits shareholders to
delegate part of these powers to the board through charter provisions.
Whether or not parties take advantage of private ordering to empower
the board is of great interest given the changing normative framework
applicable to Brazil's capital markets over the past two decades. This
article's empirical analysis of the corporate charters and shareholder
agreements of companies listed on the Sio Paulo Stock Exchange
(BM&FBOVESPA, now also known as B3-Brasil, Bolsa e Balcio)
reveals that shareholders appear to augment the board's decision-making
power by charter provision, especially in dispersed ownership and Novo
Mercado companies. It remains unclear, however, whether such a ten-
dency reflects a genuine predilection for greater board empowerment, or
simply a means to extend the clout of a controlling shareholder, or group
of controlling shareholders, onto the board, in view of the binding force
of shareholder agreements under Brazilian law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Concentrated ownership is the norm in Brazil. Brazilian public compa-
nies do not generally enjoy a separation of ownership and control,' at
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1. See Nelson L. Eizirik, 0 Mito do Controle Gerencial: Alguns Dados Empiricos
[The Myth of Managerial Control: Some Empirical Data], 66 REVISTA DE DIREITO
MERCANTIL, INDUSTRIAL, EcoNOMICo E FINANCEIRO 103 (1987) (revealing a
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least not to the same degree as experienced in the United States under
the traditional Berle and Means model. 2 In this vein, the literature refers
to several factors to explain ownership concentration, such as the stiffen-
ing of entrepreneurial activism and competition by the state,3 poor mi-
nority shareholder protection by the law,4 the private benefits exacted by
controlling shareholders,5 a path dependence with respect to previous
corporate ownership models, 6 and political preconditions that impede the
development of deep and liquid capital markets.7
Brazilian corporate law is unique, however, as it is historically the
product of the decisive influence of political elites and oligarchies, which
carefully select and import those foreign legal rules better suited to their
private interests.8 Notable influences also include the heavy presence of
state enterprise in the economy since at least the 1950s,9 and the institu-
tional incentives for the migration of well-established multinationals
through local branches with ample self-financing capabilities.10
complete lack of Brazilian public companies with ownership dispersion in the
1980s); Erica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concen-
trated Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for
Emerging Countries, 29 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus 439, 456 - 59 (2009) (describing the
prevalence of ownership concentration across all BM&FBOVESPA segments in
the beginning of the twenty-first century).
2. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 47 - 118 (1933).
3. See John C. Coffee Jr., The Rise ofDispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 12 (2001).
4. See Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1116 (1998);
Aldo Musacchio, Laws Versus Contracts: Shareholder Protections and Ownership
Concentration in Brazil, 1890-1950, 82 Bus. HIsT. REV. 445, 445 - 46 (2008).
5. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An Interna-
tional Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 589 - 90 (2004).
6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence of Corpo-
rate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 129 (1999).
7. See Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate
Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 601 (2000).
8. See Mariana Pargendler, Politics in the Origins: The Making of Corporate Govern-
ance in Nineteenth-Century Brazil, 60 AM. J. Comp. L. 805 (2012) (describing the
means by which traditional elites deliberately picked and chose the elements of
comparative law best suited to their private interests in the drafting of early Brazil-
ian commercial legislation).
9. See Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 2917, 2932 - 42 (2012); Mariana Pargendler, The Unintended Conse-
quences of State Ownership: The Brazilian Experience, 13 THEORETICAL
INouiRiES L. 503 (2012) (describing the evolution of the state as a shareholder in
Brazil throughout the twentieth century, and identifying, as negative externalities
thereof, an increase in the private benefits of control for the state, the exploitation
of minority shareholder value through related-party transactions, increased con-
flicts of interest between the political and profitability goals of the state, and a
general disincentive to the development of deep capital markets).the political and
profitability goals of the state, and a general disincentive to the development of
deep capital markets).
10. See Paulo Roberto Davidoff Chagas Cruz, Capitais Externos e o Financiamento de
Longo Prazo no Brasil [Foreign Capital and Long-Term Financing in Brazil], in
HIsTORICA ECONOMICA DO BRASIL CONTEMPORANEO [ECONOMic HISTORY OF
CONTEMPORARY BRAZIL] 183 (Tamis Szmecsdnyi & Wilson Suzigan eds., 1997)
(attributing the lack of deep capital markets or long-term financing sources in Bra-
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These factors explain the political economy advanced by the current
Brazilian corporation statute of 1976.11 This statute was enacted with the
express mandate of promoting the rise of large national conglomerates,12
pursuant to the military government's goal of concentrating the economy
in the hands of wealthy industrial and financial elites. 13
To this effect, the law is centered on the controlling shareholder's
clout. 1 4 One of the controversial means whereby it accomplishes this is
by allowing shareholders to bind the votes of appointed directors to their
prior directives through shareholder agreements (acordos de acionis-
tas).15 The law sets that votes cast in disregard of these agreements are
void, 16 and that the absence of a bound director at a board meeting enti-
tles other bound directors to vote in their name.17 Although generally
seen as a poor corporate governance practice,' 8 studies have shown that
binding shareholder agreements are on the rise among Brazilian public
companies.' 9 Indeed, thin and uncertain lines separate firm and control-
zil to the military government's stimulus for the migration of foreign
conglomerates).
11. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 17.12.1976 (Braz.).
12. See ALFREDO LAMY FILHO & Jost Luiz BULHOES PEDREIRA, A LEI DAS S/A
[THE CORPORATIONS LAw] 139 - 156 (1992) ("[T]he draft corporations law ... has
as its primary objective 'the creation of a corporate form for the development of
the large private enterprise, as required by the current stage of the Brazilian
economy'. . . .").
13. See REPOBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, II PLANO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVI-
MENTO (1975-1979) [II NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1975-1979)] 47 - 55
(1974) (Braz.) (describing the military government's mergers-and-acquisition pol-
icy in the development of "large financial or industrial-financial conglomerates").
14. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] Art. 116 de 17.12.1976 (Braz.).
15. See id. art. 118. The most common way by which such a control is exercised is
through prior shareholder meetings (reuniio pr6via) in which the parties to a
shareholder agreement decide how their appointed directors should vote in any
given board meeting. Directors are usually required to abstain from voting on the
matter if no consensus is reached, or if one shareholder exercises contractual veto
rights in that regard.
16. See id. § 8.
17. See id. § 9.
18. The relevance of this issue has prompted the development of a comply-or-explain
code by independent corporate governance associations, which, if adopted by the
Brazilian securities regulator, may apply to all companies listed in
BM&FBOVESPA. See GRUPO DE TRABALHO INTERAGENTES, CODIGO BRASI-
LEIRO DE GoVERNANGA CORPORATIVA: COMPANHIAS ABERTAS [BRAZILIAN
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CODE: PUBLIC COMPANIES] § 1.2.1 (2016) (recom-
mending public companies to strike board-binding shareholder agreements from
their governance arrangements).
19. See Evolu(do da Governanga Corporativa nas Empresas Listadas em Bolsa [Evolu-
tion of Corporate Governance in Listed Companies], INSTITUTo BRASILEIRO DE
GOVERNANQA CORPORATIVA (2014) (Some examples of these inconsistent trends
include: a 18.4% decrease in the number of companies which disclose information
on conflicts of interests and related-party transactions between 2009 and 2012
(from 60.8% to 42.4%); a mere 0.5% increase in the number of companies with
boards comprised entirely of independent directors between 2004 and 2012 (from
73.5% to 74.0%); a 1.9% decrease in the number of companies which ban cash
loans in favor of related parties between 2010 and 2012 (from 7.3% to 5.4%); and a
13.6% increase in the number of companies with shareholder agreements which
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ling shareholder 20 and, as a result, controlling shareholders of Brazilian
firms extract greater private benefits of control than in any other
jurisdiction.2 1
In this article, I will assess the implications of this ownership model on
the relative decision-making power of the board of directors over corpo-
rate affairs. More specifically, I will assess whether shareholders allocate
additional decision-making power to boards, beyond the statutory de-
fault, by means of the corporate charters (estatutos sociais) of all compa-
nies listed at BM&FBOVESPA, the Sdo Paulo Stock Exchange (Bolsa de
Valores, Mercadorias e Futuros de Sdo Paulo). To this effect, Part I pro-
vides a brief overview of the theory and practice on delegated manage-
ment in Brazil and abroad. Part II describes the methodology used. Part
III presents and discusses the study's main results.
A. DELEGATED MANAGEMENT IN BRAZIL AND
IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, ownership dispersion has led corporate law to
vest original and undelegated decision-making powers to the board.22
That is, insofar as managers are more attached to and familiarized with
the firm than shareholders, the law attributes all except those most funda-
mental corporate decisions to the board.23
This arrangement leads to information asymmetries and agency costs
between shareholders and management, such as those expenditures nec-
essary for preserving the welfare of the delegated management model,
including monitoring and bonding costs. 2 4 The legal and contractual pro-
visions that govern a company can increase, to varying extents, these
agency costs. Yet the fact of the matter is that the default rules of U.S.
corporate statutes enshrine the independence and the autonomy of the
bind, to any extent, the board's votes between 2004 and 2012 (from 17.7% to
31.3%)).
20. See MARIO HENRIQUE SIMONSEN, ExPosigAo DE MOTIVOS No 196, DE 24 DE
JUNHO DE 1976, DO MINISTtRIO DA FAZENDA [MINISTRY OF FINANCE'S JUSTIFICA-
TIoN No. 196, DATED JUNE 24, 1976] (1976) (convoluting firm and controlling
shareholder by setting as a fundamental premise of the draft statute that "legal
entities have the behavior and reputation of its controllers").
21. See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 5 at 550.
22. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2017); Manson v. Curtis, 223 N.Y. 313,
322 - 23 (1918) ("In corporate bodies, the powers of the board of directors are, in
a very important sense, original and undelegated. The stockholders do not confer,
nor can they revoke these powers. They are derivate only in the sense of being
received from the state in the act of incorporation."). On the defining features of
the board, see generally John Armour et al., What is Corporate Law?, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
1, 11-13 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 3rd ed., 2017) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF
CORPORATE LAW].
23. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs and Eco-
nomic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 787-89 (1972).
24. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behav-
ior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 JOURNAL FIN. ECON. 305, 323-26
(1976).
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board by restraining the means whereby shareholders may actively influ-
ence how the firm operates. 25 The board, for instance, must approve
charter amendments or corporate reorganization proposals prior to their
assessment by shareholders. 26 Additionally, the board is subject to share-
holder oversight, in its regular course of duty, only when transacting with
"all or substantially all" of the company's assets.27 Finally, the law re-
quires a supermajority quorum for the removal, without cause, of direc-
tors who sit on standard boards, and bars without-cause removal of
directors sitting on classified boards.28
This state of affairs has called attention to the director-centric nature of
U.S. corporate law. Given how the statute grants shareholders only very
exceptional instruction rights with respect to the board, advocates of this
director-centric model back the board's original and unfettered power to
direct and conduct business affairs-even at shareholders' expense.29
Opponents, however, back a redefinition of this status quo in favor of a
shareholder-centric law that grants shareholders the power to initiate or
propose fundamental changes to the company.30
The shareholder-centric approach falls in line with shareholder treat-
ment under Brazilian law. By any measure, Brazil is a fundamentally
shareholder-centric jurisdiction. With scarce exceptions, the Brazilian
model is not strictly comparable to its U.S. counterpart.3 1 Few jurisdic-
tions require board supervision for as few matters as does Brazilian law.
The only decisions necessarily subject to the board's authority under the
current statute are the appointment and monitoring of officers, the (non-
binding) annual review of the officers' accounts, 32 the appointment of ap-
praisers for purposes of appraisal proceedings,3 3 and the power to call a
25. Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918) ("As a general rule, the stockhold-
ers cannot act in relation to the ordinary business of the corporation, nor can they
control the directors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by virtue of
their office . . . Directors are the exclusive, executive representatives of the corpo-
ration and are charged with the administration of its internal affairs and the man-
agement and use of its assets.").
26. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242(b)(1), 251(b)-(c) (West 2017).
27. Id. § 271(a).
28. Id. § 141(k)(1).
29. See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate
Governance, 48 Bus. LAw. 59 (1992); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:
The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547 (2003).
30. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REv. 833 (2005). For responses to this submission, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735
(2006), and Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk,
93 VA. L. REV. 733 (2007).
31. See Mariana Pargendler, How Universal is the Corporate Form? Reflections on the
Dwindling of Corporate Attributes in Brazil 26-29 (2016) (unpublished working
paper) (on file with author).) (arguing that the near unanimous presence of con-
trolling shareholders, the supremacy of the shareholder meeting's powers pursuant
to the applicable statute, and the possibility of binding a board's votes through
shareholder agreements severely hamper the delegated nature of Brazilian boards).
32. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976, art. 142, 1, 1II, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 17.12.1976 (Braz.).
33. Id. art. 45, § 4.
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shareholder meeting (which can be superseded by five-percent of share-
holders if the board delays a summons for eight days, or by any share-
holder should this delay reach sixty days). 34 In addition, although the
statute sets the board's authority to fix the general directives for the com-
pany's business, 35 such directives are subject to the shareholders' instruc-
tion rights to decide on any matters involving the company's management
and operation. 36
Moreover, almost every Brazilian public company is controlled by a
clearly-defined shareholder or group of shareholders,3 7 as companies can
access equity finance sources at no prejudice to the controlling sharehold-
ers' interest via the issuance of non-voting preferred shares.3 8 The long
list of statutory powers allocated to the shareholder meeting,39 the share-
holders' right to increase these powers by means of binding shareholder
agreements, 40 and the lack of security of tenure enjoyed by dissenting
directors, all work to vest decision-making power in the controlling share-
holder or shareholders.4 1 As a result, controlling shareholders are de
facto entitled to run the company, regardless of board acquiescence to
their directives. 42
Consequently, any board authority beyond the statutory default will
depend on private ordering. The statute permits shareholders to contract
around certain default rules and to confer additional decision-making
power upon the board through the company's charter.43 To be sure, such
freedom is restricted to those issues not already allocated to the share-
holder meeting's authority.44 Further, shareholders are free to later re-
voke any such powers through a charter amendment or a without-cause
removal of dissenting directors. Finally, shareholders may restrict the
scope of these powers by means of a binding shareholder agreement.45
Despite this, assessing the extent that shareholders take advantage of
their permission to delegate part of their authority to the board is inter-
esting because the very idea of a strong monitoring board is fairly recent.
34. Id. art. 123.
35. Id. art. 142.
36. Id. art. 121.
37. See supra note 2.
38. See Lei No. 6.404, art. 15, § 2.
39. Such issues include the unfettered power to: repurchase shares; amend the charter;
authorize corporate reorganizations; file for bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings;
reduce the minimum dividend payout; exit or enter a group of companies; set man-
agement's compensation; grant employee stock options; and takeover other close
or public companies. Id. arts. 44, 122, 136, 152, 168, 255.
40. See Id. arts. 116, 118, §§ 8, 9; see supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
41. See Lei No. 6.404, art. 140.
42. To be sure, the shareholder meeting will never be able to represent the company
or otherwise usurp the (few) original and undelegated prerogatives of manage-
ment, but will rather have to simply remove and appoint those managers (includ-
ing members of the controlling group itself) loyal to the controlling shareholder's
interest. Id. art. 139.
43. See infra Part II.
44. See Lei No. 6.404, arts. 44, 122, 136, 152, 168, 255.
45. See Id. arts. 116, 118, §§ 8, 9; see supra notes 18-19.
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The study of corporate governance, which is primarily concerned with the
agency relationship between managers and shareholders, only came to
the forefront of legal scholarship in the 1970s. 4 6 At that point, the schol-
arship began to advocate the empowerment of the board's monitoring
power through independent or non-executive directors as a means to cur-
tail serial cases of corporate abuses and corruption in the United States.47
Under this new arrangement, independent directors would function as
trustees to the shareholders before the company's insiders in dispersed-
shareholding companies, or to minority shareholders before controlling
shareholders in concentrated-shareholding companies. 4 8
The Brazilian capital markets felt these developments towards the end
of the twentieth century, when BM&FBOVESPA created three premium
governance-listing segments: Nivel 1, Nivel 2 and Novo Mercado.4 9 In
light of repeated failures at legislative reform, BM&FBOVESPA took the
initiative in creating opt-in segments directed at newly-listed companies;
it reflected an attempt to kindle the voluntary adoption of better corpo-
rate governance practices by Brazilian companies.50 These best practices
seek to empower minority shareholders and independent directors, and,
in the Novo Mercado segment, include a bar on the issuance of non-vot-
ing preferred shares, 5 ' a mandatory bid rule for all shareholders, 52 and
the attribution of at least twenty-five percent of the board's seats to inde-
46. See Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 361,
362 (2016) (describing the rise of the corporate governance field as a reaction to
the deregulation of Wall Street in the 1970s, and to a growing jadedness toward the
quality of state intervention, so that corporate governance, in this light, arose as an
attractive alternative to the increasing market and state failures).
47. See id., at 369-378, and Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the
United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 1465, 1514-20 (2007). .
48. John Armour et al., The Basic Governance Structure: The Interests of Shareholders
as a Class 17-21 (ECGI, Law Working Paper No. 337/2017) (describing the trustee-
ship strategy as an efficient and prevalent (albeit imperfect) means of mitigating
agency costs across different corporate contexts, and describing how, in concen-
trated-shareholding systems like Brazil, "truly independent directors are more
likely to be seen as champions of minority shareholders").
49. Further BM&FBOVESPA reform created the Bovespa Mais and Bovespa Mais
Nfvel 2 segments in 2007 and 2014, respectively, directed to small and medium
enterprises wishing to gradually go public and adopt the best corporate govern-
ance practices required for admittance into the Novo Mercado segment. Needed
citation, 49a, 49b: See BM&FBOVESPA, BOVESPA MAIS, http://www.bmfbovespa
.com.br/pt_br/listagem/acoes/segmentos-de-listagem/bovespa-mais/; see also
BM&FBOVESPA, BOVESPA MAIS NfVEL 2, http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/
listagem/acoes/segmentos-de-listagem/bovespa-mais/. Albeit of limited relevance
as of this date, I equally considered the 15 companies listed in these segments on
the reference date herein.
50. See Maria Helena Santana, The Novo Mercado, in Novo MERCADO AND ITS FOL-
LOWERS: CASE STUDIES IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM 2-36 (Maria He-
lena Santana et al. eds., 2008) (describing the motivations, legal grounds, results
and perspectives of the Novo Mercado segment); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Regula-
tory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United
States and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 482-502 (2011).
51. BM&FBOVESPA, REGULAMENTO DE LISTAGEM DO Novo MERCADO, § 3.1(viii)
(2011).
52. Id. § 8.1.
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pendent directors.5 3
BM&FBOVESPA's reform had an astounding effect on the Brazilian
capital markets. In varying degrees, it limited the pre-existing divorce
between political and financial rights in a company's shares 54, it stirred
the development of the primary market's liquidity and of ownership dis-
persion among the more developed companies 5 5 , and led to an exponen-
tial increase in the value of listed assets and shares of Brazilian
companies.56 But despite this success, empirical studies have shown an
inconsistent trend in the adoption of those best corporate governance
practices regarding the board5 7 , so that conclusively evaluating the extent
of its effects, at least with respect to the empowerment of Brazilian
boards, requires further research.
II. METHODOLOGY
In this study, I undertook to analyze the corporate charters and the
shareholder agreements of all 346 companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA
as of September 13, 201658 whose charter and shareholder agreements (if
any) were made available on the website of either BM&FBOVESPA or
the Brazilian securities regulator, Comissdo de Valores Mobilidrios.
I surveyed each charter pursuant to fourteen variables chosen to re-
present fourteen decisions with which the board may be incumbent de-
pending on how shareholders approach the default rules on power
allocation. For each variable, a company received a point if its charter
attributed a decision to the board, or no point where it attributed it to the
shareholder meeting or to the officers, or simply did not reference it
where the statute's default rule does not allocate such decision to the
board.
Further, I examined each shareholder agreement (if applicable) to ac-
count for boards that in spite of having authority under the charter, are
53. By reserving at least 20% of the board's seats to independent directors, and forbid-
ding the chief executive officer from also holding the seat of the chairman of the
board. Id.
54. See Gilson, supra note 50, at 498 (noting that the Novo Mercado segment in-
creased the cost of common voting shares to the controlling shareholders by bar-
ring non-voting preferred stock, thereby mitigating "the previously pervasive
wedge between voting and cash flow rights").
55. See Gorga, supra note 1, at 523-5, (describing how the five largest shareholders of
companies listed in the Novo Mercado segment hold, on average, 56.16% of its
shares; a number which rises to 91.60% in the Nivel2 segment, 84.79% in the Nivel
1 segment, and 85.19% in the traditional segment).
56. See Dados de Mercado [Market Data], BM&FBOVESPA (Jul. 13, 2016), http://www
.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/servicos/market-data/consultas/dados-de-mercado/.
(This data shows a 433% increase in the total BM&FBOVESPA market capitaliza-
tion between 2002 (the Novo Mercado segment's debut year) and 2009 (the last
year before the stagnation and eventual decline of the Brazilian economy, as a
result of the current recession)).
57. INSTITUTo BRASILEIRO DE GOVERNANCA CORPORATIVA, supra note 17.
58. A list of these companies was obtained at Empresas Listadas [Listed Companies],
BM&FBOVESPA (Sep. 13, 2016), http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/produtos/lis-
tados-a-vista-e-derivativos/renda-variavel/empresas-listadas.htm.
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bound by ex-ante shareholder directives. In this regard, a company re-
ceived a point for every decision conditioned to prior shareholder con-
sent under a shareholder agreement.
I divided the fourteen variables according to the default allocation of
power under the statute, bearing in mind that shareholders are free to
contract around any such rules. Variables one through three refer to deci-
sions for which the board is responsible under the default rule. Variables
four through eight refer to decisions for which the officers are responsible
under the default rules. Variables nine through fourteen refer to deci-
sions for which the shareholder meeting is responsible under the default
rule.
A. DEFAULT RULES ALLOCATING POWER TO THE BOARD
Variable 1. Sale of real estate. The default rule holds the board incum-
bent with approving the sale or transfer of permanent assets, which in-
clude real estate59 , be they held for purposes of investment or as a part of
the company's fixed assets.60 This variable looks at whether the charter
keeps this authority within the board's reach.
Variable 2. Guarantee of third-party obligations. The default rules em-
power the board to approve guarantees for third-party obligations. 61 To
be sure, this variable disregards subsidiaries and focuses on obligations
entirely extraneous to the company. This variable also looks at whether
such power is maintained within the board in the charter.
Variable 3. Issuance of non-convertible debentures. In public compa-
nies, the default rule is that the board may issue non-convertible deben-
tures at its own discretion.62 This variable also looks at whether the
board retains power over this decision in the charter.
B. DEFAULT RULES ALLOCATING POWER TO THE OFFICERS
Except where the law states otherwise, the officers have the power to
execute any and all agreements and undertake any and all measures
deemed necessary for the running of the company.63 The law permits
shareholders, however, to subject some or all of such decisions to prior
board approval.64 Whether or not shareholders contract to condition
these decisions to board approval is the object of variables four through
eight.
59. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976 (Braz.).
60. Id. art. 178, § 1 and art. 179.
61. Id. art. 142, VIII.
62. Id. art. 59, § 1. This variable excludes financial institutions, which are subject to
severe legal restrictions on the issuance of debentures. See Art. 35, Lei No. 4.595,
de 31 de dezembro de 1964, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 31 de janeiro
de 1965 (Braz.).
63. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976 (Braz.). An officer may not, how-
ever, make donations at the company's costs without board approval, loan herself
cash or assets without director or shareholder approval, or vote as a shareholder in
the approval of her own accounts.
64. Id. art. 142, VI.
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Variable 4. Debt contracts. This variable looks at whether the board
must approve loans or other similar types of debt agreements before their
execution by the officers.
Variable 5. Waivers. This variable looks at whether the board must ap-
prove any rights, waivers, or releases, including settlements in judicial
proceedings, before concluded by the officers.
Variable 6. Corporate acquisitions. This variable looks at whether the
board must approve the purchase of equity interests in other companies
prior to being carried out by the officers.
Variable 7. Opening of branches. The law does not allocate authority
over the opening of branches, offices, or establishments. The charter
must therefore expressly set such an authority, lest it shall fall within the
officers' general powers of representation.65 Accordingly, this variable
will identify those companies that have allocated such authority to the
board.
Variable 8. Related-party transactions. Regarding conflicts of interest
issues, Brazilian corporate law only directs shareholders and managers to
avoid decisions in which they have a conflicting interest with the com-
pany, or from which they may derive private benefits or gains.66 But the
law is silent as to the how these related-party transactions should be ap-
proved, i.e. whether they require prior board or shareholder approval, so
that, unless otherwise provided to the charter, officers may execute such
transactions without board or shareholder oversight.67
Following international convergence 6 8, the most advocated alternative
to this default rule in Brazil is that of prior board approval of related-
party transactions. 69 This variable will look to whether the board is so
empowered by the charter. Nonetheless, given the widespread presence
of controlling shareholders among Brazilian companies, a majority of the
minority rule might be even more effective for purposes of curtailing pri-
vate benefits of control and ensuring the rejection of impartial transac-
tions.70 This would follow other jurisdictions, such as the United
Kingdom, which opts to allocate authority over related-party transactions
65. See id.
66. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976 (Braz.).
67. See id.
68. See Luca Enriques et al., Related-Party Transactions, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE
LAW, supra note 22, at 153-154 ("the significant development in past years has
been convergence in jurisdictions' reliance on board approval, at least when it
comes to listed companies").
69. See Grupo de Trabalho Interagentes, supra note 18 (recommending, within the
code's purported 'comply or explain' scope, that "[t]he charter shall define which
related-party transactions should be subject to approval by the board of
directors.").
70. See Leo E. Strine Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of
the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 678 (2005)
(describing how, in the U.S. context, a majority of the minority rule for control-
ling-shareholder transactions creates powerful protections for minority
shareholders).
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to the shareholder meeting, in regards to transactions with directors71 , or
to disinterested shareholders, in regards to transactions with substantial
shareholders. 72 The receptiveness to such a rule in Brazil, however, is
unclear.
C. DEFAULT RULEs ALLOCATING POWER TO
THE GENERAL MEETING
Variable 9. Issuance of new shares. When so authorized by the charter,
the board may increase the company's share capital upon the issuance of
new shares.73 The limit of this increase is the authorized capital, as set
forth by the shareholders in the charter.74 This variable thus looks at
whether boards are empowered to issue new shares in this respect.
Variable 10. Interim dividends payments. As a rule, dividends are paid
out on an annual basis, pursuant to the annual shareholder meeting's di-
rective.75 Management, however, may have the power to declare and pay
interim dividends on a monthly basis if so expressly authorized by the
charter.76 This variable will hence identify boards that are so
empowered.
Variables 11 and 12. Prior approval or review of charter amendments.
In Brazil, the shareholder meeting has the original and undelegated
power to amend the charter, regardless of board approval.7 7 This differs
from the mandatory rule in the United States, where charter amendments
require both board and shareholder approval.78 These variables will look
at whether shareholders adopt a comparable rule through the charter and
grant the board power to, respectively, approve or review charter amend-
ment proposals before shareholders hear and vote on them.
To be sure, such a rule might be of less relevance in an ownership con-
centration scenario as that present in Brazil, where controlling sharehold-
ers retain their undelegated right to remove, without cause, any directors
that attempt to block their charter amendment proposals.79 Nonetheless,
it is interesting to survey whether companies contractually adopt a similar
rule in Brazil because even the power to review proposals is indicative of
the board's influence on the shareholder meeting's decision-making pro-
cess. Further, whereas a small number of Brazilian companies enjoy
71. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 108-206 (U.K.), and also Luca Enriques et al.,
supra note 68, at 156-158 (describing other jurisdictions, such as the United States
and France, which adopt this normative basis).
72. See Listing Rules, 2005, S.I. 2005/35, LR 11.1.7 (U.K.).
73. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, Dezembro 1995 (Braz.).
74. Id. arts. 166 and 168.
75. Id. art. 132, II.
76. Id. art. 204.
77. Id. art. 122, I.
78. See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 8, §§ 242(a)(1), 251(b); Edward Rock et al., Fundamental
Changes, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw, supra note 22, at 174-180.
79. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, Dezembro 1995 (Braz.); Rock et
al., supra note 78, at 174-78 ("In a system with concentrated holdings, by contrast,
a bilateral board-shareholder veto is likely to be empty since controlling share-
holder can generally choose boards that will do their bidding.").
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ownership dispersion8 o, the same rationale used for U.S. companies could
justify the prior board approval of charter amendments rule therein.8 1
Variables 13 and 14. Prior approval or review of corporate reorganiza-
tions. In mergers, incorporations, or spin-offs, Brazilian corporate law
mandates that managers of the companies involved (that is, the officers,
as representatives of the company 82) must execute a protocol with the
terms of the reorganization8 3 , which, together with a justification, is sub-
mitted to the shareholder meeting's approval.84 Corporate reorganiza-
tions thus do not require board approval if articulated directly between
shareholders and officers. This is indeed opposite to the mechanism
adopted in the United States and United Kingdom, where the board must
always approve reorganization proposals before shareholder review.85
As such, these variables will look to whether a charter expressly empow-
ers the board to respectively approve or simply review reorganization
proposals before their submission to the shareholder meeting's approval.
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results of the study are set out in TABLE 1 to TABLE 6. I have
separated their presentation into five subparts: the results for the entire
population, the results by BM&FBOVESPA listing segment, the results
by ownership dispersion, the results for financial institutions, and the re-
sults for state-controlled companies.
A. RESULTS FOR THE POPULATION
TABLE 1 presents the results for the entire population by variable. It
shows that shareholders allocate additional decision-making power to the
board 56.06 percent of the time, ranging from 95.94 percent of boards
with the power to issue non-convertible debentures, to 1.45 percent of
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. Considering the shareholder meeting's power to amend the charter, doubts remain
where such a rule would even be enforceable before Brazilian courts should share-
holders opt to circumvent it. Whereas shareholders of Brazilian companies are
empowered to summon shareholder meetings, there would be few obstacles in
practice for them to bypass this rule and approve an amendment previously re-
jected by the board. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. The references to
the original and undelegated powers of the shareholder meeting in the commen-
tary on this matter appear to strengthen the contention that courts might not ac-
cept the imposition of the board in this particular decision-making process. See 2
Modesto Carvalhosa, COMENTARIOS A LEI DE SOCIEDADES ANONIMAS [COMMEN-
TARY ON THE CORPORATIONs LAw] 777-786 (5th ed., 2011); 2 Nelson L. Eizirik, A
LEI DAS S/A COMENTADA [COMMENTATED CORPORATIONs LAw] 29-32 (2011).
82. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, Dezembro 1995 (Braz.).
83. See id.
84. Id. art. 225.
85. See supra note 26 and accompanying text, and Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 905(1)
(U.K.). Although issues of enforceability remain with respect to these variables,
scholars seem to be more receptive thereof than of variables 11 and 12. See Nelson
L. Eizirik, supra note 81, at 294 (acknowledging that "certain corporate reorgani-
zations, such as spin-offs and mergers, [could be subject] to the board's prior
review").
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companies subjecting charter amendments to prior board approval. Ad-
ditionally, TABLE 1 shows that directors are bound to shareholder agree-
ments 21.40 percent of the time, ranging from 35.57 percent in respect to
decisions on related-party transactions, to 9.03 percent in respect to deci-
sions on the opening of branches.
I propose two interpretations of these results. First, the 56.06 percent
rate might suggest that shareholders contract around default rules in or-
der to augment the board's true and independent decision-making power.
Shareholders would therefore prefer to allocate additional powers to the
board, widening the scope of its authority, and restricting shareholder in-
terference on the management of company affairs.
Such an interpretation, however, ignores the ownership framework of
these companies. As discussed, control by one or a group of clearly-de-
fined shareholders, often instrumentally strengthened by the use of a
binding shareholder agreement, is the norm among Brazilian public com-
panies. 86 With the shareholders' power to remove dissenting directors in
mind, it would make little sense for them to expand the number of issues
subject to the approval of costly and time-consuming shareholder meet-
ings. That is, shareholders exercise more efficient control through bind-
ing shareholder agreements, or plausibly through the removal of
dissenting directors, than through the constant summons of minority
shareholders to shareholder meetings.
In this light, the large number of empowered boards would merely re-
flect an economizing strategy, whereby a controlling shareholder puts the
discussion of these issues beyond the minority's control through the
cheaper and quicker decision-making process of the board. With related-
party transactions specifically, approval by the board, even if entirely
bound by a shareholder agreement, avoids ex ante or ex post legal battle
over the validity of a controlling shareholder's vote at a shareholder
meeting, in light of the statutory provision on conflict of interests.87
Indeed, the relatively high proportion of empowered boards greatly de-
creases in issues where the private interest of shareholders is more
acutely apparent. For instance, related-party transactions are unusually
important to influential shareholders that might also be suppliers, con-
sumers, creditors, or simply commercial partners of the company, and
thus might use these transactions to exact as many private benefits from
their control as possible.8 8 Consequently, these transactions are also of
great interest to minority shareholders, which have an interest in delegat-
ing these decisions to impartial directors and thus curbing the controlling
shareholder's power to unduly extract these private benefits to their det-
riment.89 Such dichotomy could explain why related-party transactions
86. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; also see Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de
Dezembro de 1976, Dezembro 1995 (Braz.).
87. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, Dezembro 1995 (Braz.).
88. See Vladimir Atanasov et al., Law and Tunneling, 37 J. CORP. L. 1, 7-8 (2011).
89. See Enriques et al., supra note 68, at 153-54 (listing as benefits of delegating re-
lated-party transaction approval to independent directors: low costs of monitoring;
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are subject to board approval only 43.06 percent of the time, and why
board decisions in this respect are bound to shareholder agreements a
record 35.57 percent of the time. In other words, although considered a
corporate governance best practice.90 companies either rarely set forth
board approval of related-party transactions or only do so when com-
bined with a means to bind the board's independence to a controlling
shareholder's will.
The board's power to approve or reject charter amendments or corpo-
rate reorganizations is also subject to the same rationale. It is true that
doubts as to the enforceability of such a rule can at least in part explain
these small percentages. 91 Regardless, the particularly high stakes for
shareholders-especially controlling shareholders-when it comes to
charter amendments or corporate reorganizations, may also play a hand
in these variables. 92 For example, as the document responsible for defin-
ing the basic governance structure of a company, charter amendments are
subject to a particularly high threshold of review by shareholders, which
may not be willing to subject this decision to the uncertainty inherent of a
board's decision.93 Corporate reorganizations, in turn, may not only fun-
damentally alter the nature of a shareholder's initial investment, but also
lead a company to comply with costly appraisal rights 94 , or possibly with
the procedure to list the surviving company at BM&FBOVESPA.95 In
either event, a controlling shareholder's wariness at having their private
interests potentially contested by an unfavorable board decision may ex-
plain the few empowered boards in this respect.
TABLE 2 addresses the relationship between empowered boards and
bound boards, and also tends to support this latter interpretation. It first
shows that stronger-than-average boards are generally bound to a greater
degree by shareholder agreements than weaker-than-average boards. It
also shows that boards bound to any degree by shareholder agreements
are generally stronger than those not subject to any binding at all. This
data corroborates the conclusion that a board is strong only to the extent
a controlling shareholder harnesses the means to enjoin its subservience,
such as a binding shareholder agreement. 96 Accordingly, controlling
a high probability that transactions that are effectively profitable for the company
will still be approved; and the power such directors will have to question suspect or
self-interested controlling shareholder transactions); see also La Porta et al., supra
note 4 (discussing the benefits at large of empowering minority shareholders, and
finding a correlation between oppressed minority rights, i.e. the minority's right to
judicially contest a controlling shareholder's decision, and ownership dispersion).
90. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 81, 85 and accompanying text.
92. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J. L.
& ECON. 395, 416 (1983) (arguing that, given their magnitude, "[s]hareholders, as
residual claimants, have the most to lose (or to gain) as a result of fundamental
corporate changes").
93. See Edward Rock et al., supra note 78, at 178.
94. See Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de Dezembro de 1976, Dezembro 1995 (Braz.).
95. Id. art. 223, § 3.
96. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text; also see Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de
Dezembro de 1976, Dezembro 1995 (Braz.).
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shareholders grant less power to directors where they lack such a mecha-
nism to do so, as to avoid costly ex post court battles to cancel or void
dissenting votes.
Some concrete examples serve to advance this argument. The com-
pany with the most powerful board is B2W, an e-commerce company,
which scored in all fourteen variables. This company, however, is subject
to the majority control of Lojas Americanas, which, in turn, is subject
both to the majority control of the 3G Capital group and to a shareholder
agreement that completely binds its directors' votes. The second strong-
est board belongs to Odontoprev, a dental insurance company, which
scored in thirteen variables and is subject to the minority control of an
investment fund. This fund, however, is wholly-owned by Mr. Jos6 Ser-
iperi Filho, the founder, chief executive officer, and board member of the
company. All things considered, there seems to be little difference in
how control is exercised in these two companies. For instance, in the
weakest company of the population, Suzano Holding, a paper and rubber
company scored in only one variable and is completely controlled by its
founders, the Feffer family. In all cases, managerial power is inseparable
from the controlling shareholder's clout, so that it would be hard to argue
that the board has independent decision-making power, in the true sense
of the phrase.
If this is the case, then shareholders do not truly intend to empower the
boards authority. Although this may well be the case for a certain class of
companies, 97 the data for the population suggest that allocating authority
to the board may be more of an economizing strategy of the controlling
shareholder, to which exercising control through tightly-bound directors
rather than through the shareholder meeting is economically more effi-
cient, than a means to enshrine the board's independent monitoring and
decision-making powers.
B. RESULTS BY BM&FBOVESPA LISTING SEGMENT
The data in TABLE 3 addresses the effects of the different
BM&FBOVESPA listing segments-the traditional segment, Nivel 1,
Nivel 2, Novo Mercado, Mais, and Mais Nivel 2-on the decision-making
power of the board. It shows an upward trend in power as one goes from
the traditional segment through the Nivel 1, Nivel 2, and the Novo Mer-
cado segments. In the latter, boards are substantially more powerful than
the mean of the population, while companies listed in the former are con-
siderably weaker relatively, when compared thereto.
A few reasons may explain this trend. First, the application of the one
share, one vote principle9 8 and a greater number of minority shareholders
as a result of free-float rules in the Novo Mercado segment9 9 lead to more
97. See infra Parts III.B and III.C.
98. See supra notes 38, 51 and accompanying text.
99. Companies listed in the Nivel 2 and Novo Mercado segments must have at least 25
percent of free-floating shares (i.e. shares not held by the controlling shareholders,
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minority shareholders with greater decision-making rights. 0 0 They may
consequently exert greater influence in the board's appointment process
and pressure it to resist controlling shareholder measures detrimental to
the minority. 0 1 Further, controlling shareholders might wish to signal
their commitment with best corporate governance practices to minority
shareholders and investors at large by increasing the scope of indepen-
dent director review. 102 This would be in line with the U.S. trend of inde-
pendent director empowerment as a means to curtail the dark side of
insider influence.1 0 3 Finally, considering the correlation between Novo
Mercado listing and shareholding dispersion,' 04 greater power among
Novo Mercado companies might simply reflect the lack of shareholder
interest in effectively informing themselves as to its business and, as is
commonplace in the United States'0 5 , their tendency to delegate such de-
cisions to specialized management. As will be seen, the data in TABLE 4
below corroborates this inference.1 06
Accordingly, no surprises lay in the weakness of traditional-segment
boards, given the strong divorce between political and financial share-
holder rights'0 7 , the lack of independent directors' 0 8 , and the extremely
their related parties, or managers). See Regulamento de Listagem, do Novo Mer-
cado [Novo Mercado Listing Rules], BM&FBOVESPA, § 3.1(vi), (2011); Regula-
mento de Listagem do Nivel 2 [Nivel 2 Listing Rules] BM&FBOVESPA, § 3.1(vi)
(2011).
100. By prohibiting the issuance of non-voting preferred shares, minority shareholders
gain additional decision-making rights and more adequate means to contest a con-
trolling shareholder's will in shareholder meetings and board meetings. See Enri-
ques et al., The Basic Governance Structure: Minority Shareholders and Non-
Shareholder Constituencies, in ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAw, supra note 22, at
84.
101. By requesting, for instance, cumulative voting in the election of the board, pursu-
ant to Art. 141, § 4, Lei No. 6.404, de 15 de dezembro de 1976 (Braz.). See Luca
Enriques et al., supra note 68, at 80-84 (describing an appointment rights strategy,
i.e. the empowerment of minority shareholders in the election of the board, as a
means of reducing agency costs between controlling and minority shareholders).
102. Given the rules of the Nivel 2 and Novo Mercado segments regarding independent
director participation. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
103. The literature considers independent directors a viable means to reduce agency
costs across corporations inasmuch as they serve as fiduciaries in the monitoring of
self-interested agents. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. More spe-
cially, in regards to majority and minority conflicts, moral and reputational con-
cerns may enjoin the adoption of a more combative stance by independent
directors against self-interested dealing by controlling shareholders, reducing the
latter's influence within the board. Approaching the issue from a different stand-
point, a desire to empower minority shareholders may simply enjoin the allocation
of more decision-making power to the board, thereby reducing a controlling share-
holder's means of initiating exploitive measures against the minority. The result, in
either event, is greater decision-making power to the board. See Luca Enriques et
al., supra note 68, at 94-95.
104. See supra note 55.
105. See supra note 23.
106. See infra Part III.C
107. The analyzed charters revealed that 82.66% of the companies listed in the tradi-
tional, N[vel 1 and N(vel 2 segments issued at least some non-voting preferred
shares.
108. The analysis also reviewed that the charter of only 11.48% of the companies listed
in the traditional and Nivel 1 segments provide for the mandatory participation of
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concentrated shareholdings' 0 9 among these companies. Indeed, light is
shed upon this contrast when noting how 69.23 percent of companies
scoring in over eleven variables are Novo Mercado companies, while
ninety percent of companies scoring in fewer than four variables are
traditional-segment companies.
Yet, TABLE 3 also casts some doubt as to the suitability of these conclu-
sions. The table shows that Novo Mercado boards are subject to over
twice as many binding shareholder agreements than traditional-segment
boards.1 10 Even though low percentages are involved, such a stark differ-
ence may favor the interpretation that powerful boards tend to reflect
only the controlling shareholder's power within the board, in line with the
data set out in TABLE 2 above.
Two examples may help to advance this contention. Both Slo Carlos, a
construction company, and Tegma, a logistics company, are Novo Mer-
cado companies that scored in twelve variables herein-a result which
could lead to the conclusion that these are companies with relatively
strong boards.' Shareholder agreements, however, completely bind
their directors' votes and allow for decision-making only upon share-
holder consent. These boards can therefore take no decisions without
prior shareholder approval, so they are in effect less independent than
that of Suzano Holding, which is at least united in its few decisions. Rele-
vant in this sense is how Nivel 2 companies-the second-best premium cor-
porate governance segment-bind, on average, over one-third of their
directors' votes, including almost two-thirds of votes pertaining to re-
lated-party transactions. 1 12
In sum, the positive relationship between premium corporate govern-
ance listing segments and board decision-making power presented in TA-
BLE 3 suffers due to the number of binding shareholder agreements to
which Nivel 2 and Novo Mercado boards. are subject. Notwithstanding,
the given the percentages involved, the common-sense intuition that
Novo Mercado companies enjoy stronger boards, as a result of their bet-
ter corporate governance practices, appears to be confirmed by the
independent directors on the board. On the qualitatively poor organization of
Brazilian boards in general, see Bernard S. Black et al., Corporate Governance in
Brazil, 11 EMERG. MARK. REV. 21 (2010).
109. See supra notes 1, 55 and accompanying text.
110. To be sure, a relatively high number of shareholder agreements among Novo Mer-
cado companies makes sense, given the greater level of shareholding dispersion in
this segment. Yet the shareholder agreements discussed herein go beyond a mere
coordination mechanism for purposes of securing a majority at shareholder meet-
ings to also bind the vote of party-appointed board members. See supra notes 15-
19 and accompanying text. It is this latter type of arrangement which is detrimen-
tal to the independent decision-making power of the board, inasmuch as it essen-
tially forbids boards from taking any such decisions without first consulting and
obtaining the controlling shareholder's consent.
111. See Regulamento de Listagem, do Novo Mercado, BM&FBOVESPA. .
112. See Regulamento de Listagem do Nivel 2, BM&FBOVESPA.
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data.113
C. RESULTS BY OWNERSHIP DISPERSION
TABLE 4 displays the study's results for the ninety-seven companies
with less than five percent of free-floating common shares and for the
twenty-one companies with over ninety-five percent of free-floating com-
mon shares. 114 The table also shows a clear contrast between these two
subsets: the boards of concentrated-shareholding companies are nearly
ten percent weaker than the mean, while the boards of widely-held com-
panies are nearly twenty percent stronger than the mean.
This difference is particularly noticeable in decisions regarding related-
party transactions, charter amendments, and corporate reorganizations,
in which dispersed-shareholding companies score over twice as much as
concentrated-shareholding companies. That is, the contrast comes to the
forefront in those variables in which a board can more acutely impose
itself against an influential shareholder's private interests.1 15
Further, data in TABLE 4 supports the independent nature of board
power in dispersed-shareholding companies inasmuch as they are subject
to far fewer binding shareholder agreements than are concentrated-
shareholding companies. Although higher shareholder coordination
costs among dispersed-shareholding companies might explain these re-
sults, the end product is that directors of these companies are also freer
from shareholder interference in exercising their greater decision-making
power compared to concentrated-shareholding companies. 116
This data therefore suggest that dispersed-shareholding companies are
a subset in which the board's independent decision-making power is ef-
fectively empowered, and not as a part of a controlling shareholder's
economizing strategy. Two different narratives may explain this scenario.
On one hand, the individually insignificant holdings in these companies
may cause shareholders to become rationally apathetic as to the com-
pany's business, mostly because it is economically irrational for them to
expend time and money with such information given their likely meek
financial benefit.' 17 Shareholders might deem it more efficient to dele-
gate a greater number of decisions to a specialized board, as is common-
place in the United States.1 18 Of course, this inference warrants a caveat
insofar as shareholders may always revoke such additional powers down
the road, or simply remove directors that utilize them against their pri-
vate interests. 119
113. See Regulamento de Listagem, do Novo Mercado, BM&FBOVESPA; Regula-
mento de Listagem do Nivel 2, BM&FBOVESPA.
114. On the rules concerning free-float, see supra note 99.
115. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text.
116. See Infra at Table 4.
117. On the issue of shareholder rational apathy in general, see the debate described
supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 39-36 and accompanying text.
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On the other hand, information asymmetries between dispersed share-
holders and executive directors1 20 may have prompted the board to pro-
pose and promote charter amendments in favor of its own power
throughout the years, thereby exacerbating shareholder-manager agency
costs. Although this is a recurring theme with respect to antitakeover
rules in the United States 121, it is unprecedented in Brazil given its
predominantly-concentrated ownership framework.122 Confirmation of
this hypothesis would require a longitudinal analysis of these charters;
but, the disparity in board power between concentrated- and dispersed-
shareholding firms seems to suggest it holds some merit.
Several individual companies support this analysis. BRF, the food ser-
vices company, and Equatorial, an energy distributor, both scored in
twelve variables herein and are not under the control of any clearly-de-
fined shareholder group, so their board has unfettered independence in
exercising their considerable statutory powers. Other dispersed-share-
holding companies, such as Renner, a clothing reseller, Embraer, the air-
craft manufacturer, and Paranapanema, in the metallurgy market, all
scored in over nine variables therein. Further, although twenty of the
twenty-one dispersed-shareholding companies are also Novo Mercado
companies, Kepler Weber, a silo manufacturer, stands alone as the only
traditional-segment, dispersed-shareholding company. It scored in twelve
variables, but has a board partially bound by a shareholder agreement
among the minority shareholders, Previ and Banco do Brasil.
In conclusion, collective action and rational apathy problems, in addi-
tion to efficiency considerations, may have led shareholders of dispersed-
shareholding companies to delegate a greater number of decisions to
their boards. Alternatively, managerial agency costs may have prompted
a board to promote charter amendments in favor of its own authority
120. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The De-
sirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1820, 1836-1840
(1989) (arguing for constraints on the charter amendment process on the basis of a
shareholder's inability to discern value-increasing from value-decreasing proposals
when presented by a self-interested board).
121. See Harry DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and
Stockholder Wealth, 11 JOURN. FIN. ECON. 329 (1983).
122. For instance, the widespread use of poison pills and other antitakeover mecha-
nisms in Brazil mainly derived from attempts by concentrated-shareholding com-
panies to restrict the development of combative minority blockholders when listing
their shares in premium corporate governance segments. See Modesto Carvalhosa,
As Poison Pills Estatutdrias na Prdtica Brasileira: Alguns Aspectos de sua
Legalidade [Poison Pills in Brazilian Corporate Practice: Some Legality Considera-
tions], in DIREITO SOCIETARIo: DESAFIos ATUAIS [CORPORATE LAW: CURRENT
CHALLENGES] 21 (Rodrigo R. Monteiro de Castro & Leandro Aragdo eds., 2009)
(noting that "poison pills have been distorted by the Brazilian capital markets:
instead of protecting against hostile takeovers, they are used to reinforce the com-
pany's current controlling shareholder"), and Erica Gorga, supra note 1, at 479-483
(noting the use of poison pills among concentrated-shareholding companies, and
concluding that "controlling shareholders do not understand the effect of the
clauses and that lawyers fail to explain to their clients the full implications of an-
titakeover clauses").
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over time. Regardless, the results point to a strong relationship between
ownership dispersion and a board's independent decision-making powers.
D. RESULTS FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
The last items of this Article address two subsets of companies that
require special attention in light of the normative regimes to that they
submit: financial institutions and state-controlled companies.
TABLE 5 displays the study's results for the twenty-five financial institu-
tions part of this study.1 23 The table shows that financial institutions en-
joy significantly weaker boards when compared to the mean, but which
are also subject to far fewer binding shareholder agreements.
Three different features of Brazilian financial institutions may explain
these results. First, extreme ownership concentration is the norm among
financial institutions. 12 4 Indeed, financial institutions have, on average,
only 10.77 percent of free-floating common shares, so their controlling
shareholders exercise uncontested power over the management of their
business affairs. Nonetheless, this could only serve as a partial explana-
tion, as financial institutions have boards that are even weaker than the
concentrated-shareholding subset of companies examined herein.125
The second reason stems from the specific normative regime advanced
by corporate governance scholars for financial institutions on the basis of
their importance to the economy and the high leverage to which they are
subject. 126 In practice, information asymmetry considerations insulate in-
fluential and well-informed officers from board and minority shareholder
oversight, which hampers these constituencies' monitoring function vis-a-
vis the financial institution's insiders. 127 That is, operational and regula-
tory matters unique to financial institutions mean independent directors
may not have the desired effect on the quality of management or the
company's results, given their inevitable informational dependency on
123. See infra at Table 5.
124. See Part III.C supra for a discussion on the relationship between ownership disper-
sion and board decision-making power.
125. See infra Table 4.
126. See Ross Levine, THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF BANKS: A CONCISE Discus-
SION OF CONCEPTS AND EVIDENCE (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
No. 3404, 2004); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, The Corporate Govern-
ance of Banks, 9 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW 91 (2003).
127. See Thankom G. Arun & John D. Turner, Corporate Governance in Banks in De-
veloping Economies: Concepts and Issues, 12 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: AN IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW 371 (2004) (arguing that "the opaqueness of bank assets
makes it very costly for diffuse equity holders to write and enforce effective incen-
tive contracts or to use their voting rights as a vehicle for influencing firm deci-
sions"); Peter 0. Milbert, Corporate Governance of Banks, 10 EUROPEAN
BUSINESS ORGANIZATION LAW REVIEW 411 (2009) (describing how a financial in-
stitution's balance sheets are notoriously plagued by opacity, so that "[the] board
of directors will find it difficult to observe whether management did actually meet
their performance targets and whether this resulted from the shift to a riskier busi-
ness strategy than expected and anticipated").
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the company's insiders.128
This problem is particularly aggravated when an identical group of per-
sons both control and manage a financial institution. This is often the
case in Brazil, where the near-totalitarian control of financial institutions
is the norm. Officers hold massive stakes in their respective companies,
which impairs or impedes board oversight and entrenches insiders loyal
to a controlling shareholder's directives.129 Further, as described in the
literature, these officers tend to use their influence to elect only those
board members who pledge to offer little resistance to their tenure.130
In Brazil, controlling shareholders dominate the most important mana-
gerial roles of financial institutions. Among the forty-seven chairmen,
vice-chairmen and chief executive officers of the seventeen private finan-
cial institutions analyzed herein, legal disclosures personally and ex-
pressly list twenty-five of them as controlling shareholders. For instance,
while Mr. Pedro Moreira Salles leads the board of Brazil's largest bank,
Itad Unibancoand, Mr. Roberto Setiibal holds the office of chief execu-
tive officer, and both men are members of the bank's controlling family
group.13 1 The Malucelli family controls Banco Parand, and has appointed
Mr. Alexandre Malucelli as chairman and Mr. Cristiano Malucelli as chief
executive officer of the company.1 32 Mr. Sasson Dayan, Mr. Morris
Dayan, and Mr. Carlos Moche Dayan are all controlling shareholders of
Banco Daycoval and sit, respectively, as chairman, vice-chairmen, and
chief executive officer of this bank. 3 3 Even less traditional financial in-
stitutions, such as Banco BTG Pactual or Banco Pine employ controlling
shareholders as chairmen of the board.
128. See Marcelo Cabus Klotzle & Luciana de Andrade Costa, Governanga Corpora-
tiva e Desempenho dos Bancos no Brasil [Corporate Governance and Bank Per-
formance in Brazil], 4 REVISTA ELETRONICA DE GESTAO ORGANIZACIONAL 22
(2006) (finding no correlation between best corporate governance practices, in-
cluding the appointment of independent directors, and the financial results of 19
Brazilian banks between 1998 and 2003, which is attributed by the authors to the
heavy regulation on the financial sector in Brazil).
129. See Stephen Prowse, Corporate Control in Commercial Banks, 20 THE JOURNAL
OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH 509 (1997). In this paper, the author shows how boards
of financial institutions appear to be unable to effectively react to negative results,
so that these "boards appear to be less assertive in their corporate governance
responsibilities than in manufacturing firms". The offered explanation is that in-
sider managers are especially entrenched in financial institutions by holding more
shares in the company than independent directors or dissenting minority share-
holders. As a result, officers are free from third party interference, while indepen-
dent directors have little monetary incentives and even fewer practical means to
exercise their monitoring function. In this regard, see also Ross Levine, supra note
126, at 7-8.
130. See Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New
Board Members: An Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829 (1999).
131. Press Release, Itad Unibanco Holding S.A., Itad Unibanco Announces New Chief
Executive Officer and New Executive Committee (Nov. 9, 2016).
132. Company Overview of Parana Banco S.A., BNA, http://www.bloomberg.com/re-
search/stocks/private/people.asp?privcap d=26960746.
133. Company Overview of Banco Daycoval S.A., BNA, http://www.bloomberg.com/
research///stocks/private/people.asp?privcapld=28286814.
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In other cases, officers, albeit not expressly cited as controlling share-
holders, are even more bound to the shareholders who appointed them.
For example, Mr. Gilberto Occhi not only leads the board of Banco PAN,
but is also the chief executive officer of the state bank Caixa Econdmica
Federal and chairman of its subsidiary Caixa Participaples, which is one
of Banco PAN's two controlling shareholders. 134 Banco Bradesco is cur-
rently controlled by the joint efforts of Fundagdo Bradesco, the Aguiar
family, and a group of employees and managers encompassed by the
holding company BBD. 3 5 Mr. Lazaro de Mello Branddo, the current
chairman of Banco Bradesco, is not only the largest shareholder of BBD,
but also serves as chairman and chief executive officer of Fundagdo
Bradesco, which, directly holds around seventeen percent of the bank's
voting shares. 136
In either event, the study has shown that a thin and tenuous line sepa-
rates a financial institution's top-tier management and its controlling
shareholders. This disposition means that a board, or a board's monitor-
ing functions, are very unnecessary, as the interests of the officers will be
identical to that of the company's residual financial owners further elimi-
nating any potential agency costs between these two constituencies. Even
in those companies with a greater number of minority shareholders, con-
trolling shareholders can curb their influence by dictating the board's
agenda through its chairman and vice-chairman. As a result, there is no
need to allocate many issues to the board's authority. In fact, it is prefer-
able that power be exercised directly through the company's officers and
indirectly through the controlling shareholder's entirely unfettered
powers.
A third reason further explains the weakness of these boards. Finan-
cial institutions are under a very specific unlimited liability statute.1 37
Upon such a company's liquidation or invention proceedings, managers
are liable for all acts or omissions and for all obligations contracted dur-
ing their tenure that have been defaulted by the financial institution.13 8
Case law has even held that managers charged for such faults are under a
rebuttable presumption of fault.139 Further, controlling shareholders are
jointly liable, regardless of fault, to the same extent as managers during
134. Board of Directors & Management, PAN, https://ri.bancopan.com.br/conteudo
en.asp?idioma=1&conta=44&tipo=62313.
135. Board of Directors, BRADESCo, https://www.bradescori.com.br/site/conteudo/in-
terna/default3.aspx?secaold=806&idiomald=2.
136. See generally id.
137. See Mariana Pargendler, supra note 31, at 20-21 (describing the liability regime to
which managers and controlling shareholders of financial institutions are subject).
138. See Arts. 39 and 40, Lei No. 6.024, de 13 de margo de 1974, DIARIO OFICIAL DA
UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 8 de abril de 1974 (Braz.).
139. See S.T.J., REsp No. 447.939/SP, Relator: Ministra Nancy Andrighi, 04.10.1995,
DIARIO DA JUSTIQA [D.J.], 25.10.2007, 166 (Braz.); but see also S.T.J., REsp No.
592.069/SP, Relator: Ministro Carlos Alberto Direito, 15.02.2007, DIARo DA JUS-
TICA [D.J.], 30.04.2007, 308 (Braz.) (holding that managers may be held liable for
outstanding obligations regardless of fault).
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these liquidation or intervention proceedings.140
In light of these outcomes, it can be inferred that controlling sharehold-
ers have little incentive to allocate greater authority to the board. This is
especially true for independent or non-executive board members to the
extent that any future harm caused or outstanding obligations contracted
by these managers could be demanded from the shareholder body in a
potential liquidation or intervention proceeding.14 1 That is, the law appli-
cable to financial institutions favors the legal status quo with the empow-
erment of the shareholder meeting and the reservation of only a second
role to the board of directors. Indeed, of all analyzed financial institu-
tions, only two enjoyed a board more powerful than the mean: Banco de
Brasilia, which scored in eight variables, and Banco Mercantil de Investi-
mentos, which scored in nine variables-both companies marked by high
ownership concentration.
In sum, the study has revealed that weak and seldom-bound boards are
a defining feature of financial institutions. These results can be explained
both by the high degree of shareholding concentration in these compa-
nies, which has led to a near-perfect identity between managers and con-
trolling shareholders, and by the pressures arising out of the unlimited
liability regimes to which these constituencies are subject.
E. RESULTS FOR STATE-CONTROLLED COMPANIES
Finally, the last item of this study assesses board power among state-
controlled companies (sociedades de economia mista).
The literature on the state as a shareholder is vast and convergent as to
concerns for possible conflicts of interests between the state's dual objec-
tives of (a) satisfying the public interest that motivated the state enter-
prise's creation, and (b) generating profit for its shareholders.142
Attempts to counter these conflicts have been proposed in Brazil over the
years including BM&FBOVESPA's Special Program on State Enterprise
Governance, which is a listing certificate granted to state-controlled com-
panies that implement certain corporate governance best practices'43,
140. See Art. 1, Lei No. 9.447, de 14 de margo de 1997, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 15 de margo de 1997.
141. An efficiency argument may explain the erosion of limited liability in respect to
financial institutions. In light of the legal system's inability to curb negative exter-
nalities arising out of the financial sector, the law curtails moral hazard by holding
managers and shareholders to the threat of personal liability, thereby reducing
their incentives to undertake socially undesirable business. See Mariana Pargen-
dler, supra note 31, at 34-36 ("the erosion of limited liability for financial institu-
tions in Brazil intervenes in the ex ante incentives of controlling shareholders and
managers of banks, a regulatory option that may be more effective than the system
of command and control regulation of banks").
142. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. For a comparative overview of state-
controlled companies, see Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, GOVERNANCE
OF LISTED STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE: A REPORT PREPARED FOR ASSOCIACAO
BM&F (2016) (working paper) (on file with authors).
143. See BM&FBOVESPA, PROGRAMA DESTAQUE EM GOVERNANQA DE ESTATAIS
[SPECIAL PROGRAM ON STATE ENTERPRISE GOVERNANCE] (2015), available at
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and the State Enterprise Act, which sets forth a new legal framework for
all state-controlled companies.1 44
Notwithstanding the above, listing a state-controlled company may be
a fruitful endeavor for the state, the company, and potential private in-
vestors. A private investor's incentives to monitor and discipline state-
appointed managers tend to promote efficiency and bestow credibility
upon the enterprise.1 4 5 In exchange, private investors receive legal and
financial guarantees of the security and profitability of their interest,
which can come in the form of voluntary adoption of best corporate gov-
ernance practices further restraining the scope and severity of potential
conflicts of interest between the state and minority shareholders.3.4 6 Fur-
ther, if state officials have financial incentives to promote private over-
sight of state enterprise, and if minority shareholders receive, in
exchange, the means to carry out this function, stronger-than-average
boards among state-controlled companies should result.
TABLE 6, however, shows that the boards of state-controlled companies
are in fact weaker than the mean, albeit subject to an almost null level of
binding shareholder agreements. Nonetheless, a closer look at the data
shows that the above presented theoretical model may hold true in rela-
tion to the pertinent companies. Out of the twenty-six examined state-
controlled companies, sixteen have less than eight percent of free-floating
common shares, so it would be difficult to argue that minority sharehold-
ers are present in a sufficient number of them.1 4 7 Actually, the boards of
http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/pt-br/listagem/acoes/governanca-de-estatais/. As
opposed to the Nivel 1, Nivel 2 and Novo Mercado segments, this program is not
an actual listing segment, but rather a voluntary, opt-in certificate, from which a
company may later detract at no cost or penalty. This change in
BM&FBOVESPA's strategy is criticized as reducing the incentives for a company
to stick with the (little ambitious) best corporate governance practices adopted
thereunder. Up to September 13, 2016, not a single company had adhered to the
program. See Curtis Milhaupt & Mariana Pargendler, supra note 142, at 50-51.
144. Lei No. 13.303, de 30 de junho de 2016, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 10
de julho de 2016 (Braz.).
145. See Mariana Pargendler et al., In Strange Company: The Puzzle of Private Invest-
ment in State-Controlled Firms, 46 CORNELL INT. L. J. 569, 575-577 (2013).
146. See Mariana Pargendler et al., supra note 145, at 582-589.
147. Yet a lack of minority shareholders should not constitute per se an impediment to
the empowerment of the board. In certain scenarios, wholly-owned state enter-
prise may be beneficial where the state is particularly conflicted in pursuing its
political and profitability goals. See Pargendler, supra note 9, at 2959 - 61. In-
deed, the Organization for the Economic Co-operation and Development recom-
mends the empowerment of the board's monitoring function regardless of whether
the state owns all or part of such an enterprise. See Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], OECD Guidelines on Corporate Gov-
ernance of State-Owned Enterprises (2015), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/
download/2615061e.pdf?expires=1492549044&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=
452FBBF8EFD9427F34D36840AAA13307. Brazilian law follows this approach,
at least in part, by treating state-controlled companies and wholly-owned state en-
terprise in the same vein throughout most of the State Enterprise Act. Both of
these companies, for example, are required to subject related-party transactions to
the board's review, which must be composed with at least 20 percent independent
directors. See Lei No. 13.303, de 30 de junho de 2016, DiAmo OFICIAL DA UNIAO
[D.O.U.] de 07.01.2016 (Braz.).
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these sixteen companies are on average 10 percent weaker than the
boards of the nine companies with over one-third of free-floating com-
mon shares.148
Moreover, on average, the boards of the fifteen companies listed on the
traditional BM&FBOVESPA segment score on exactly half of the vari-
ables, while the four Novo Mercado companies score 60.71 percent of the
time.1 49 This statistic at least shows a strong resistance among the more
traditional state-controlled companies in adopting best corporate govern-
ance practices that are liable to stimulate a more active role for the board
and for minority shareholders. For instance, if the eighteen state-con-
trolled companies currently issuing non-voting preferred shares adapt to
the Novo Mercado segment's directives, or if the eighteen state-con-
trolled companies not currently attributing any board seats to indepen-
dent directors adapt to the State Enterprise Act, minority shareholders
may enjoy greater decision-making.150 This trend could force greater
board involvement in corporate affairs in the near future, as the board
also comes to act as a trustee for the interests of these minority share-
holders.15' Interestingly, the State of Sdo Paulo's state-controlled compa-
nies (CESP, EMAE and Sabesp) appear to have taken the forefront in
this respect, as these three companies also enjoy the three strongest
boards among the examined state enterprises, scoring 78.57 percent of
the time.
Finally, the small number of binding shareholder agreements should
not come as a surprise, as these companies are legally required to remain
under a majority control by the state. 152 The few shareholder agreements
that exist generally arise from state-private investor arrangements - such
as the agreement between the State of Minas Gerais and Andrade Gutier-
rez for a minority investment in CEMIG-or from inter-state arrange-
ments-such as the agreement between the State of Goids and Eletrobrds,
a state-run electricity company for the management of CELGPAR.
All in all, even if the boards of state-controlled companies are weaker
than the mean listed company, there is both empirical and theoretical
support to infer a change in this trend in the near future. As these com-
panies come to adopt better corporate governance practices it is likely
that the presence of minority shareholders and independent directors will
give way to a more active role for the board so that weak boards cannot
be construed as a feature of state enterprise per se.
148. See generally id.
149. See generally id.
150. As minority shareholder come to hold voting common shares, and not non-voting
preferred shares, and thus acquire the means to object to the controlling share-
holder's initiatives at shareholder meetings. See supra note 51, 54 and accompany-
ing text.
151. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
152. See Art. 5, III, Decreto-Lei No. 200, de 25 de fevereiro de 1967, DrARIO OFICIAL
DA UNIAO [D.O.U] de 17 de julho de 1967.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article sought to analyze the contractual allocation of decision-
making power surrounding the board of directors in Brazilian public
companies. The results show that although shareholders appear to em-
power boards through their contractual arrangements-especially those
shareholders of Novo Mercado and dispersed-shareholding compa-
nies-any conclusion inferred therefrom must be tempered with at least
four considerations.
First, any additional decision-making power will never surmount the
shareholder meeting's supreme authority over the company, nor can it
somehow restrain shareholders in revoking this power later on down the
road through a charter amendment or a without-cause director removal.
Second, the matters to which the variables refer are relatively trivial
when compared to those matters under the shareholder meeting's origi-
nal and undelegated legal authority. Third, given the predominance of
the concentrated-shareholding model in Brazil, additional board deci-
sion-making power could reflect a mere economizing strategy by the con-
trolling shareholder, thereby avoiding costly shareholder meeting
discussions through the enforcement of directives by its appointed board
members. Finally, any board decision-making power might not be as in-
dependent as the charter implies due to the fact that controlling share-
holders often bind a director's vote to fully-enforceable shareholder
agreements.
This study was therefore a first attempt at mapping the allocation of
independent decision-making power among Brazilian boards, especially
in light of the transformation undergone by the Brazilian capital markets
over the last couple of decades. Future efforts may go beyond the scope
proposed herein by examining, for instance, the de facto interactions be-
tween shareholders, directors, and officers and the influence each of
these constituencies bear on the handling of the company's business or
the changes in board power over a set period of time. In any event, I
hope the data and conclusions obtained herein will enrich the future de-
bates on the matter.
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TABLES
TABLE 1
Empowered and bound boards in the population

















Relationship between empowered and bound boards
Type of Binding Type of Empowerment
board Number events (%) Board Number events (%)
Stronger than
mean 205 22.71 Bound 89 61.24
Weaker than
mean 141 15.30 Not bound 257 53.86
TABLE 3
Empowered and bound boards by BM&FBOVESPA listing segment
Listing segment Empowered boards (%) Bound boards (%)
Traditional 49.40 11.48
Nfvel 1 50.90 22.34
Nfvel ) 59.92 36.94
Novo Mercado 63.93 25.59
Mais 63.74 41.38
Mais Nfvel 2 53.57 80.00
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TABLE 4
Empowered and bound boards in companies with less than 5% and more than
95% of free-floating common shares
Variable Free-floating common shares (%)
0-5 95-100
Empowered Bound boards Empowered Bound boards
boards (%) (%) boards (%)
1 89.69 22.99 100 9.52
2 93.81 20.88 95.24 10.00
3 93.02 15.00 100 14.29
4 58.76 31.58 90.48 15.79
5 40.21 20.51 66.67 14.29
6 78.35 26.32 100 14.29
7 49.48 6.25 28.57 0
8 29.90 27.59 52.38 9.09
9 69.07 16.42 100 9.52
10 90.72 10.23 100 4.76
11 0 0 4.76 0
12 20.62 10.00 33.33 0
13 2.06 0 9.52 50.00
14 17.53 0 42.86 11.11
Mean 52.04 18.54 65.99 10.82
TABLE 5
Empowered and bound boards among financial institutions
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TABLE 6
Empowered and bound boards among state-controlled companies
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